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NOTES
JUS TERTII AS A DEFENSE TO CONVERSION SUITS
IN INDIANA-TOWARD A MORE RATIONAL
APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
Conversion is the primary civil remedy available today for serious
interferences with personal property.' Though conversion is largely
a modern tort action, its complex rules and principles are deeply
rooted in the early English common law.2 This lasting historical in-
fluence has made it virtually impossible for the courts to agree on
a common definition of the tort.3 Thus, many questions relating to
the nature and operation of conversion have been left open for legal
debate.4 The purpose of this note is to explore one of those questions.
1. There are two primary actions available to a plaintiff seeking civil redress
for interferences with personal property. Conversion, while largely limited to serious
interferences, is the preferred remedy. When the interference caused by the defen-
dant's act does not justify forcing the defendant to pay the full value of the property
in damages, a plaintiff is limited to a trespass action. In the trespass action, the defen-
dant would only reimburse the plaintiff for the actual damages caused to the chattels.
F. HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS S 25 (1933).
2. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS S 15 at 79 (4th ed. 1971).
3. Dean Prosser has pointed out that the attempts made at defining conver-
sion have been ineffectual at best. Id. at 79 n.73. Some of the more common attempts
include: "[wihat is a conversion, but an assuming upon one's self the property and
right of disposing of another's goods?" Baldwin v. Cole, 6 Mod. 212, 87 Eng. Rep. 964
(1704). Conversion is "an act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful
justification, by which the person is deprived of its use and possession." Note, A New
Found Haliday: The Conversion of Intangible Property-Re-Examination of the Action
of Trover and Tort of Conversion, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 511, 519 [hereinafter cited as Note,
A New Found Haliday]. "Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control
over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it
that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 222 A(1) (1965).
4. Most of the legal scholarship has concentrated on the question of what
a party must show to qualify as a plaintiff in a conversion action. See, e.g., E. WAR-
REN, TROVER AND CONVERSION (1936); Philbrick, Seisen and Possession as the Basis of Legal
Title, 24 IOWA L. REV. 268 (1939); Note, Trover and Conversion-Respective Rights of Owner
and Possessor When the Property is Converted by a Third Party, 22 MINN. L. REv. 863
(1938) [hereinafter cited as Note, Respective Rights of Owner and Possessor]. The more
recent treatments of conversion have delved into questions relating to what may be
converted. See, e.g., Note, A New Found Haliday, supra note 3, at 525-33.
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The most appropriate method in which to introduce this ques-
tion is to posit it in a realistic hypothetical fact situation.5 Assume
that Jones has possession of certain valuable paintings. However, for
one of a variety of possible reasons, he does not have an absolute
title to them. At some point during the course of Jones' possession,
Smith commits an act which seriously interferes with the paintings.'
Consequently, Jones sues Smith for the conversion of the paintings
praying for their full value in damages. In defense of this suit, may
Smith escape liability by alleging that title to the paintings is in one
other than Jones? In other words, may Smith plead the jus tertii
defense?
Recently, the Indiana Court of Appeals for the fourth district
was confronted with the same question in a unique context.? Pursuant
to a valid search warrant, several Indianapolis police officers seized
items of allegedly stolen personal property from a garage and home
owned by the plaintiff No criminal charges relating to the seized
property were filed. The police,however, refused to return some of
the seized property to the plaintiff.9 Subsequently, the plaintiff sued
the City of Indianapolis, the police officers involved in the seizure,
and the owner of the garage in which the police department stored
seized property for conversion." Thus, the question clearly presented
was whether the defendants could defend against the conversion suit
5. This hypothetical is based upon the facts in Ardisco Financial Corp. v.
De Margoulies, 21 A.D.2d 295, 250 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1964).
6. One of the most difficult determinations that must be made in a conver-
sion suit is whether the defendant's acts were serious enough to amount to a conver-
sion of the plaintiff's chattels. The RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS sets out one comprehensive
approach.
(2) In determining the seriousness of the interference and the justice
of requiring the actor to pay the full value, the following factors are
important:
(a) the extent and duration of the actor's exercise of domin-
ion or control;
(b) the actor's intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent
with the other's right of control;
(c) the actor's good faith;
(d) the extent and duration of the resulting interference with
the other's right of control;
(e) the harm done to the chattel;
(f) the inconvenience and expense caused to the other.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 222 A(2) (1965).
7. Noble v. Moistner, .Ind. App. , 388 N.E.2d 620 (1979).
8. Brief for Appellant at 10, Noble, __Ind. App. - , 388 N.E.2d 620.
9. The plaintiff argued that because no criminal charges were filed, the police
had no right to detain the seized property. Id. at 3.
10. Noble, __nd. App. at - , 388 N.E.2d at 620.
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by alleging that title to the seized property was in a third party."
This note endeavors to provide a rational response to this question.
In responding to the question posed, the origins of the tort of
conversion are first explored in an attempt to explain the historical
foundations on which the courts have based their answers to the ques-
tions posed above. Courts have traditionally followed one of two ap-
proaches in determining whether a defendant should be allowed to
plead the jus tertii defense. Both of these approaches are based on
jurisprudential and scholarly analysis of the original common law deci-
sions. Thus, an examination of the early English case law on conver-
sion is vital to any discussion of the jus tertii defense. Second, a com-
prehensive description and analysis of the two traditional approaches
to the jus tertii defense will be undertaken, including an examination
of the approach clearly preferred by the Indiana courts. This analysis
will also cover practical applications of the traditional approaches in
an effort to further illustrate their effect on a plaintiffs conversion
suit. Finally, it will be shown that neither traditional approach effec-
tively protects all of the interests in the converted property. Each
approach protects only one of the parties to the conversion action.
However, neither approach fully protects a third party who has an
interest in the converted property. Thus, a more rational approach,
one which attempts to protect all of the interests in the property in
a single efficient judicial determination, will be suggested and tested.
HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF CONVERSION
The common law forms of action are largely alien to modern
proceedings." However, the old forms of actions are valuable in the
analysis of today's legal process. Many of the elements and theories
developed during the days of formalistic pleading requirements con-
tinue to influence the shape and content of the law." Few areas of
11. Id. at -, 388 N.E.2d at 622; Brief for Appellee at 20, Noble, __ Ind.
App. - 388 N.E.2d 620. The appellate court set out the Indiana approach to the
jus tertii defense and remanded for further fact finding. Noble, - Ind. App. at -,
388 N.E.2d at 622. No further disposition of the case has been reported.
12. Salmond, Observations on Trover and Conversion, 21 L.Q. REV. 43 (1905).
The common law forms of action went out of existence in large part because of their
complexity, confusing nature and undue formalism. By the conclusion of the thirteenth
century, the formulary system had become so rigid and closed that only a few fixed
forms of action existed. It was only after the English civil wars of the fourteenth
century that the ancient forms of action were expanded to reach situations that were
historically not susceptible to remedy in the King's courts. See generally, J. FLEMING
AND G. HAZARD. CIVIL PROCEDURE S 1.3 (2d ed. 1977).
13. Salmond, supra note 12, at 43.
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the law feel this influence as strongly as the tort of conversion. 14 Thus,
analysis of the jus tertii defense necessarily begins with an examina-
tion of the origins of conversions. 5 Early common law forms of action
provide the basis from which the modern tort of conversion
developed. 6
Detinue Sur Trover
Originally, the primary common law action protecting an in-
14. In no branch of the law is this more obvious than that which relates
to the different classes of wrongs which may be committed with respect
to chattels. In particular the law of trover and conversion is a region
still darkened with the mists of legal formalism, though which no man
will find his way by the light of nature or with any other guide save
the old learning of writs and forms of action and the mysteries of pleading.
Id.
15. Commentators have typically begun their discussions of the tort of con-
version with an overview of the common law forms of action which preceded the modern
tort. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at S 15; Note, A New Found Haliday, supra
note 3, at 511.
16. Donahue, Kauper and Martin explain the development of the early com-
mon law forms of actions using the following chart:
13th C
DEBT (derived from a
considerably earlier
period)
14th C
DETINUE
15th C. DETINUE DETINUE
SUR SUR
BAILMENT TROVER
16th C
17th CI
TRESPASS
TRESPASS
d.b.a.
TRESPASS
ON
THE CASE
ACTION ON THE CASE
SUR TROVERI
TROVER
Reproduced from: C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER AND P. MARTIN. CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROP-
ERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 45 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as DONAHUE. KAUPER AND MARTIN].
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dividual's interest in personal property was the action of detinue. 17
A common situation in which an action for detinue sur trover8 could
be maintained arose when an individual, acting innocently, found an
item of personal property. His acquisition of the chattel was not in
and of itself actionable in the early common law courts. However, if
the true owner of the property came forward and demanded the return
of the property and the finder refused, the true owner had an action
in detinue sur trover.9 In his complaint the plaintiff alleged that: (1)
he had possession of the chattel; (2) while being so possessed he lost
it; (3) the defendant found the chattel; and (4) the defendant refused
to deliver it on request and had consequently detained it."0 If the ac-
tion was successful, the property was "affirmed in the plaintiff."" In
other words, the court would order the defendant to turn the chattel
over to the plaintiff.22
Detinue sur trover was an important action for the protection
of possessory interests in personal property, yet it suffered from a
variety of severe procedural drawbacks.23 The primary drawback at-
tendant to a claim in detinue was that the defendant could, at his
option, choose to wage his law.' This was a form of licensed perjury
which made the outcome of the lawsuit largely dependent upon how
17. Simpson, The Introduction Of The Action On The Case For Conversion, 75
L.Q. REV. 364 (1959).
18. There were two branches of the action of detinue. Detinue sur bailment
was available to a bailor who sought the return of bailed chattels wrongfully detained
by a bailee. Detinue sur trover varied from its sister action only in that the plaintiff
did not have to show any previous contractual relationship between himself and the
defendant. Thus, while detinue sur bailment was a contractual action in nature, detinue
sur trover was a pure tort action. C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW:
TORT AND CONTRACT 102 (1949). Detinue sur trover should not be confused with the com-
mon law action of trover which developed late in the 16th century. See supra text
accompanying notes 50-60.
19. J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 52 (5th ed. 1977). The phrase "true owner"
is used here for convenience alone. A plaintiff in a detinue sur trover action merely
alleged that he possessed the goods as his own. Thus, it was possible for one without
an absolute title to sue in detinue. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
20. C. FIFOOT, supra note 18, at 104.
21. Id. at 110.
22. See infra note 28 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion
of the remedy available in detinue.
23. Simpson, supra note 17, at 365.
24. A defendant would "wage his law" by taking an oath in open court that
he was not liable to the plaintiff. The defendant would also bring in eleven compurgators
who would swear under oath that the defendant was telling the truth. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1416 (5th ed. 1979).
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many dishonest friends the defendant could find to support this un-
just claim to the plaintiff's property.25
A second serious obstacle which confronted detinue plaintiffs
evolved around the defendant's freedom to select the remedy.26 The
logical remedy, and the only one ostensibly permitted under the com-
mon law rules of detinue, was return of the chattels.' However, legal
historians have shown that defendants were able to elect either to
return the chattel to the plaintiff or pay over the full value of the
chattel in damages.'8 A defendant could exercise this option to work
a great injustice on the plaintiff. For example, if a defendant seriously
damaged the plaintiffs chattels, he would certainly elect to return
the goods to the plaintiff rather than pay their full value to him."
There was no rule forbidding the defendant from unilaterally limiting
his liability in this manner despite the obvious possibility that the
plaintiff might not receive all of his chattel in return, but instead only
a portion of the original value.0
Finally, a third drawback to detinue actions was one which was
common to all inflexible common law forms of action.2 Detinue ad-
dressed only a narrow class of wrongs to the plaintiffs chattels."2 In
its formalistic nature, detinue could be maintained only in those cases
in which the defendant acquired possession of the property through
a lawful act and then detained it despite the plaintiffs demands for
its return.' Therefore, if the defendant wrongfully obtained posses-
sion of the plaintiffs chattels, detinue would not be maintainable.'
Detinue was also unavailable as a remedial measure if the defendant
was unable to return the plaintiffs chattels due to the actions of a
third party. 5 The action of detinue, therefore, provided little true pro-
tection of the plaintiffs interests in personal property.
25. Simpson, supra note 17, at 365.
26. Id. at 364.
27. Ames, The History of Trover, 11 HARV. L. REV. 374, 383 (1898).
28. Simpson, supra note 17, at 364.
29. This option could also be exercised to the plaintiffs disadvantage in the
converse situation. Thus, if the defendant was charged with detaining a unique chat-
tel, say an original Rembrandt painting, he may have chosen to pay its value rather
than return it.
30. See C. FIFOOT, supra note 18, at 102.
31. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
32. See Ames, supra note 27, at 379-83.
33. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
34. The essence of detinue was the wrongful detention of the chattels and
not the wrongful taking of them. DONAHUE, KAUPER AND MARTIN. supra note 16, at 45.
35. A defendant could successfully defend against a detinue sur trover action
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1984], Art. 5
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A plaintiff seeking the return of his detained chattels could easily
be frustrated by the procedural options available to a defendant in
detinue. Moreover, if the damages to the plaintiff's property were
caused by means other than by their detention or if they were de-
tained by someone other than the defendant, detinue provided no pro-
tection. Thus, these "evils" of detinue forced plaintiffs, seeking to pro-
tect their interests in personal property, to pursue more favorable
forms of action." One alternative which was available to the plaintiff
seeking to protect his interests in personal property was the action
of trespass.3 1
Trespass To Chattels
The essence of the trespass action was the protection of
possessory interests in personal property.38 Accordingly, a person who
was in possession of certain chattels could recover for any intentional
interferences with those chattels. For example, if a defendant, act-
ing without the possessor's permission, took a plow from the
possessor's farm, the possessor could maintain a trespass action against
the defendant. ° If, however, a person did not have possession of the
chattels at the time of the trespass, he could not maintain the action
even though he may have been the true owner.4' Thus, an individual
who had possession of an item of personal property was able to main-
tain a trespass action against one who took it from his possession.
However, if another wrongdoer subsequently took the chattel from
by showing that he no longer possessed the chattels. This was true even if the defen-
dant sold the chattels, knowing that they were not his property, and pocketed the
money. Id. at 46.
36. See C. FIFOOT. supra note 18, at 102; J. FLEMING, supra note 19, at 52.
37. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, S 15 at 79; see also J. FLEMING, supra note
18, at 52.
38. W. PROSSER. supra note 2, S 14 at 78. This should be contrasted with the
primary justification for detinue, which sought the return of goods lawfully acquired
but wrongfully detained. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
39. Ames, The History of Trover, 11 HARV. L. REv. 275, 285-86 (1897).
40. Trespass would lie for almost any interference with the plaintiffs chat-
tel. C. FIFOOT, supra note 18, at 110. Detinue would not lie in this situation since the
wrong for which the remedy is sought is the taking and not the detention. See supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
41. If the injury which is redressed by the action is interference with posses-
sion, then the action should afford a remedy only to those who have had their posses-
sion interrupted by the defendant's actions. The owner of personal property who is
not in possession of the chattel at the time of the defendant's trespass has not had
his possession interfered with. Thus, it follows that the owner should not have a trespass
action against the defendant.
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the first trespasser, the original possessor would not have a trespass
action against the second trespasser.42
Possessors of personal property favored the trespass action over
the older action of detinue sur trover for two reasons. First, a person
who elected to sue in trespass could not be subjected to a defendant's
wager of law. 3 Thus, a defendant could not fraudently deprive a plain-
tiff of a remedy as he was able to do in a detinue action." Second,
the wrongdoers could not manipulate the mode of the plaintiff's
recovery.45 A successful trespass action resulted in an award of
damages to the plaintiff sufficient to compensate him for the injury
to his possessory interest.4
Trespass was not, however, a perfect alternative to detinue sur
trover. As was the case with detinue, the action of trespass had cer-
tain drawbacks. For example, the action would lie only for the
wrongful taking, destruction or use of the chattels." If a wrongdoer
had lawfully gained possession of the chattels and subsequently de-
tained them, the action of trespass would not be available. 8 Further-
more, even a successful plaintiff was only entitled to damages. If the
defendant retained possession of the chattels, the plaintiff would be
forced to bring a second action in detinue to recover them. 9
Neither trespass nor detinue sur trover were ideal actions for
plaintiffs seeking remedies for interferences with chattels. Detinue
would lie for wrongful detention of chattels. However, the procedural
rules of the action permitted a defendant to subject a plaintiff to a
wager of law and an election of remedies. By bringing his action in
trespass, the plaintiff avoided the procedural defects of detinue.
Trespass, however, addressed only a limited range of wrongs to per-
sonal property. Thus, plaintiffs were forced to devise a new form of
42. Ames, supra note 39, at 286.
43. Trespass was a form of the action on the case rather than a form of debt.
See supra note 16. Thus, wager of law was not available to a defendant. The explana-
tion for this distinction lies even deeper within the historical origins of the common
law, and thus, is beyond the scope of this note. See supra notes 16, 24, 25 and accom-
panying text.
44. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
46. Ames, supra note 39, at 286. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 2, S 14 at 77.
47. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, S 14 at 76.
48. Id. S 15 at 80.
49. The early common law did not allow the plaintiff to seek two remedies
in a single action. Thus, a plaintiff could not seek damages and return of his chattels
in the same suit. See Simpson, supra note 17, at 370.
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action which would adequately protect their property interests without
resort to the dreaded wager of law.
Trover
Trover emerged late in the Fifteenth Century as a branch of
the action on the case.6 At this time in history, few law reports were
published, thus the precise origin of the action on the case for trover
remains largely unknown. 51 One commentator has suggested that the
first applications most likely occurred where a finder of lost goods
either depleted the goods himself or passed them on to someone else.'
In such a situation, trespass would permit the plaintiff to recover
damages alone." However, because of a curious gap in the law,' the
plaintiff could not maintain detinue sur trover and, thus, could not
recover the goods.5 An action on the case for trover would, if suc-
cessful, permit the plaintiff to recover the full value of the chattels
while avoiding the possibility of a defendant's wager of law.,'
A plaintiff pleading in trover alleged that: (1) he was possessed
of certain goods; (2) he casually lost them; (3) the defendant found
them; (4) the defendant had failed to return the goods to the plain-
tiffs possession after the plaintiff had requested him to do so; and
(5) the defendant converted the goods to his own use.57 These allega-
tions were patterned after those employed in the older action detinue
sur trover.5 The plaintiff did not, however, allege that the goods were
wrongfully detained as he would have in an action for detinue sur
trover. Rather, the plaintiff in trover alleged that the defendant
50. The earliest reported use of action on the case for trover appeared in
1479. Id. at 364.
51. Id.
52. See W. PROSSER. supra note 2, S 15 at 79.
53. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
54. See Simpson, supra note 17, at 371.
55. See Milsom, Not Doing Is No Trespass: A View Of The Boundaries Of Case,
1954 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 105, 114.
56. See Simpson, supra note 17, at 370; see also supra note 43 and accompany-
ing text.
57. Lord Mounteagle v. The Countess of Worcester, 73 Eng. Rep. 265 (K.B.
1554). Some commentators have reported that the first allegation included an asser-
tion that the plaintiff possessed the goods "as his own proper goods." C. FIFOOT, supra
note 18, at 104.
58. In detinue sur trover the plaintiff alleged that: (1) he had possession of
certain goods; (2) he lost those goods; (3) the defendant found the goods; and (4) the
defendant had detained the goods after the plaintiff had requested their return. See
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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wrongfully converted the goods to his own use and benefit. 9 In other
words, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had made the chattels
his own. Changing the emphasis in the plaintiffs allegations justified
the imposition of a forced judicial sale on the defendant for the full
value of the converted chattels."
This new action soon became the preferred action for plaintiffs
seeking to protect their interests in personal property. The marked
increase in the use of trover during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries is directly attributable to two factors. First, trover developed
as a branch of action on the case. Thus, a plaintiff who pleaded in
trover could not be subjected to a wager of law by the defendant.0 1
Anytime the plaintiff could avoid the defendant's wager of law, he
would most certainly opt to do so. 2 The second major reason for the
preference of trover over trespass and detinue stems from the remedy
available to a plaintiff who sued in trover. A plaintiff in detinue, if
he successfully avoided the wager of law, was entitled only to the
return of his chattels." Thus, if a defendant had damaged the chat-
tels while they were in his possession, the plaintiff would not be fully
reimbursed for the interference with his chattels." A trespass action
yielded only damages for the defendant's interference with the plain-
tiffs possession."' When a trover action was successful, however, the
plaintiff was entitled to the full value of the converted goods.6
Preference for the new action lead to an expansion in the ap-
plication of the action on the case for trover.17 By the turn of the
seventeenth century, the allegations of losing by the plaintiff and find-
ing by the defendant had become nothing more than mere legal fic-
59. Numerous acts may amount to a conversion of the chattels to the defen-
dant's own use and benefit. See supra note 6.
60. In effect, the plaintiff alleged in trover that the defendant had assumed
all the rights attendant to ownership of the converted chattels without compensating
the plaintiff. Thus, the damage suffered by the plaintiff was the full value of the chat-
tels. Simpson, supra note 17, at 371.
61. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
62. Several commentators have argued that the dangers of a wager of law
have been exaggerated. See, e.g., C. FIFOOT, supra note 18, at 103.
63. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
66. Warren, Qualifying as Plaintiff in an Action for a Conversion, 49 HARV.
L. REV. 1084, 1086 (1936).
67. "It [the trover action] was like a tool originally designed for a single pur-
pose and given a name indicating that purpose which, although it later came to be
used for a number of similar purposes, yet still was called by the old name." Id. at 1085.
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tions which were, in fact and practice, untraversable by the
defendant. 8 Consequently, the substance of the action on the case for
trover became a conversion of goods that had been in the plaintiffs
possession, to the use and benefit of the defendant. 9 Once the action
was characterized in this manner, it became applicable to almost all
interferences with personal property. 0 For example, where a defen-
dant detained chattels, the plaintiff was historically restricted to the
remedy of detinue." With the advent of trover, however, the plaintiff
was, in most cases, able to posit his action within the requirements
of the trover action and thus avoid the dangers of detinue. 2 Trover
would also lie in most situations in which only trespass had previously
been available.7 3 Although the action on the case for trover never fully
displaced trespass and detinue at the common law, it did become the
most significant action for the protection of interests in personal
property.
The old action on the case for trover, from which evolved the
modern tort of conversion, was a necessary development in the scheme
of the early common law. Detinue, with its dangerous procedural
drawbacks, was not a palatable remedy. Trespass avoided these serious
drawbacks, yet it did not, in all cases, provide the plaintiff with full
protection for his interests. Trover avoided both of these problems.
It did, however, create some of its own problems. The jus tertii defense
was one problem which arose.
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO THE Jus TERTM DEFENSE
Courts have traditionally employed one of two approaches to the
jus tertii defense. A few jurisdictions permit all defendants to raise
68. See J. FLEMING. supra note 18, at 52; C. FIFOOT, supra note 18, at 104.
69. 1 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY: THEORY AND PRINCIPLES
OF TORT 232 (1906).
70. Once the common law courts recognized the losing and finding as untraver-
sable, trover virtually displaced detinue sur trover and detinue sur bailment. Trover
also became applicable in most situations of trespass. Since the only real issues in
the new action were the plaintiff's possession and the defendant's conversion, trover
did not concern itself with the manner of the defendant's acquisition. C. FIFOOT. supra
note 18, at 105.
71. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 57.
73. Previously, trespass would be the only action available to a plaintiff who
had his personal property destroyed as the result of the defendant's actions. Once
the courts fictionalized the allegations of losing and finding, a plaintiff pleading in
trover could argue that the destruction of the chattels was, in effect, a conversion
of the chattels to the defendant's own use.
1984]
Hurlbut: Jus Terth as a Defense to Conversion Suits in Indiana – Toward a
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
426 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.18
the jus tertii defense in response to a plaintiffs conversion suit. 4 Most
jurisdictions do not, however, permit the defendant to raise the jus
tertii defense unless he can in some ways connect himself with the
third party's title.75 An examination of both approaches to the jus tertii
defense will facilitate analysis of the approach utilized in the Indiana
courts.
The Possession Rule Approach
One of the traditional approaches has been labeled the "posses-
sion rule."" Its genesis lies in the earliest common law actions on
the case for trover 7 An early application of the "possession rule"
occurred in a famous nineteenth century English case. That case in-
volved a trover action initiated by a plaintiff who had purchased a
number of railroad trucks from their bankrupt owner.79 Subsequently,
the owner, while he was still in possession of the trucks, made a sec-
ond assignment of them to the defendant." The owner then delivered
the trucks to the plaintiffs possession. Believing that he, and not the
plaintiff, was the rightful owner of the trucks, the defendant removed
them from the plaintiffs possession."' In the plaintiffs suit against
the defendant for conversion of the trucks, defendant's counsel sought
to set up the title of the owner's creditors in defense. 2
The court rejected the defendant's attempt to raise the jus tertii
defense. Chief Baron Pollock's opinion merely states that a defendant
could not raise the jus tertii defense unless there was some evidence
74. A partial catalogue of the jurisdictions which employ "the possession rule"
approach may be found in Annot., 150 A.L.R. 163, 174-75 (1944).
75. A partial catalogue of the jurisdictions which allow the defendant to raise
the jus tertii defense may be found in Annot., 150 A.L.R. at 175.
76. For convenience, this traditional approach will'be referred to throughout
as the "possession rule." It should be noted, however, that this designation has not
been employed by all courts. Thus, the theory and not the label is important to the
discussion of the jus tertii defense.
77. See supra notes 16, 50-60 and accompanying text.
78. Jeffries v. Great Western Ry. Co., 5 EL. & BL. 802, 119 Eng. Rep. 680
(1856).
79. The "trucks" referred to in the report of the case consist of a frame with
two pairs of wheels supporting one end of a railroad car. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY
944 (1978).
80. Prior to the first assignment to the plaintiff, the original owner of the
trucks became bankrupt. Jeffries, 5 EL. & BL. at 802, 119 Eng. Rep. at 680.
81. Even though the defendants argued that they had not converted the trucks,
the court ruled that they were in fact wrongdoers. Id.
82. Great Western essentially argued that because the assignor was bankrupt
they were liable, not to the plaintiffs, but rather to the assignor's creditors. Id.
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that he claimed under the authority of that third party's title.' No
evidence was offered by the defendant that he was claiming under
the title of the owner's creditor. Consequently, the defendant's jus
tertii plea was necessarily impermissible.'
A number of American jurisdictions, like their English
predecessors, adhere to the "possession rule" approach. 5 In one of
the most frequently cited cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court ap-
plied the "possession rule" and denied to the defendant the use of
the jus tertii defense." The plaintiff in that case wrongfully obtained
possession of a number of logs by trespassing on the property of
another." Subsequently, the defendants removed the logs from the
plaintiffs possession. In the plaintiff's suit to recover possession of
the logs, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs prior possession
raised only a presumption of title in the plaintiff.8 This presumption
of title, contended the defendants, could be rebutted by evidence of
a third party's superior title.' The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected
this contention, and agreed with the defendant's argument that the
presumption of title raised by the plaintiff's possession was
rebuttable 0 However, the court was unwilling to permit introduction
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See supra note 74.
86. Anderson v. Gouldberg, 51 Minn. 294, 53 N.W. 636 (1892).
87. At trial, there was some dispute as to which parcel the logs were actually
taken from. The plaintiff claimed that he cut the logs from section 22. The defendants
alleged that the logs were cut from section 26. It was determined by the jury, however,
that the logs came from section 22. Anderson, 51 Minn. at 294 (not found in Northwestern
report). This finding was crucial to the plaintiffs case because the defendants claimed
to be acting under the express authority of the owners of section 26. Had the jury
found that the logs were cut from section 26, the plaintiff would have been unable
to maintain his action.
88. It has been argued that Anderson, an action in replevin, is not credible
support for application of the "possession rule" to conversion suits. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has ruled, however, that "in an action for conversion, title in a third
person is no defense, unless the defendant can in some manner connect himself with
such person, and claim under him." Brown v. Shaw, 51 Minn. 266, 267, 53 N.W. 633,
633 (1892).
89. Anderson, 51 Minn. at 296, 53 N.W. at 637.
90. Counsel [for the defendant] says that possession only raises a
presumption of title, which, however, may be rebutted. Rightly understood,
this is correct; but counsel misapplies it. One who takes property from
the possession of another can only rebut this presumption by showing
a superior title in himself, or in some way connecting himself with one
who has.
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of evidence of any third party's superior title as the defendants had
urged.9 1 It instead limited the scope of permissible rebuttal evidence
to evidence of a superior title either in the defendant himself or in
a third party to which the defendant could connect himself.92 Therefore,
when the defendants could show neither a superior title in themselves
nor one in a third party to which they could connect themselves, the
court was required to reject all of their jus tertii evidence.93
In a more recent case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court applied
the "possession rule" approach to a defendant's attempt to raise the
jus tertii defense in response to the plaintiff's conversion suit." Plain-
tiff sought the full value of timber destroyed in a forest fire caused
by the defendant's negligence.99 Even though the plaintiff had posses-
sion of the timber when it was destroyed, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts had the title." Thus, the issue squarely presented by
this case was whether a defendant, who is a mere tortfeasor, can raise
the title of a third party in defense of a conversion action. 7 The
Massachusetts court resolved the issue by holding that the defendant
could not introduce evidence of the Commonwealth's title.9" Several
significant justifications support adherence to this approach.
English common law courts employed numerous rationals to sup-
port their adherence to the "possession rule" approach.' Initially, these
courts opined that, as against a mere wrongdoer, possession is title.1"
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The court ultimately denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and
affirmed the trial court's judgment for $153.45. Id.
94. New England Box Co. v. C & R Constr. Co., 313 Mass. 696, 49 N.E.2d
121 (1943).
95. For a detailed discussion of acts which can be characterized as a conver-
sion, see W. PROSSEa, supra note 2, S 15 at 83-93. Destruction of personal property through
negligence does amount to a conversion of the destroyed chattels. Id. at 91.
96. The plaintiff received his interest in the logs through an assignment of
a contract with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Under the contract, if the logs
were not removed from the State owned land by a certain date, title to the logs would
revert to the State. The plaintiff allowed the logs to remain on state land after that
date. Thus, at the time of the defendant's conversion, title to the logs was clearly
in the State. New England Box, 313 Mass. at -, 49 N.E.2d at 128.
97. Id.
98. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant based on the
defendant's evidence of the Commonwealth's title. In its opinion, however, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court ordered a new trial. Id. at __, 49 N.E.2d at 130.
99. For a general overview of the justifications favoring application of the
"possession rule," see W. PROSSER, supra note 2, S 15 at 95.
100. Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722).
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A defendant could not, therefore, challenge that title by introducing
evidence of a third party's superior title to the converted goods.0 1
By approaching the jus tertii issue in this manner, the English courts
felt that they were, in fact, protecting title.'°' Early English courts
also applied the "possession rule" approach because of the convenience
of treating the possessor of chattel as their owner.13 This presump-
tion allowed the courts to avoid extensive investigation into the con-
verted goods' chain of title.' Another justification, frequently put forth
by the early English courts in support of the "possession rule" ap-
proach, emphasized societal interest in protection of peaceable
possession. 1 5 The "possession rule" approach furthers this societal in-
terest by deterring repeated thefts of chattels." Finally, a few English
courts drew an interesting analogy between trover and trespass. 7
These courts pointed out that the plea of jus tertii was never a per-
missible defense to an action for trespass,' 8 and theorized that there
was no logical reason justifying differentiation between trespass and
trover in this respect. 9 American courts which adhere to the "posses-
sion rule" approach have adopted most of these rationales. In addi-
tion, there are several other arguments which support application of
the "possession rule" approach." °
The original justification in support of the "possession rule"
centers on the difficulty in determining the title to a specific item
101. Jeffries, 5 EL. & BL. at 803, 119 Eng. Rep. at 680.
102. Possession and title were interchangeable concepts at the early common
law. Thus, by protecting the interests of one who had possession against a wrongdoer,
courts theoretically protected title. For an excellent discussion of the complex subject
of seisen of chattels at the common law, see Maitland, The Seisen of Chattels, 1 L.Q.
REV. 324 (1885). Professor Warren has suggested that the emphasis on possession over
title is misplaced in modern society. Warren, supra note 66, at 1087.
103. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, S 15 at 95.
104. For a further discussion of this difficulty, see infra notes 111-15 and ac-
companying text.
105. "I think it most reasonable law, and essential for the interests of society,
that peaceable possession should not be disturbed by wrongdoers." Jeffries, 5 EL. &
BL. at 805, 119 Eng. Rep. at 681.
106. "Any other rule would lead to an endless series of unlawful seizures and
reprisals in every case where property had once passed out of the possession of the
rightful owner." Anderson, 51 Minn. at 296, 53 N.W. at 637.
107. Jeffries, 5 EL. & BL. at 805, 119 Eng. Rep. at 681; Webb v. Fox, 7 T.R.
391, 397, 101 Eng. Rep. 1037, 1040 (1797).
108. C. FIFOOT, supra note 18, at 112.
109. "In this respect I see no difference between trespass and trover; for in
truth the presumption of law is that the person who has possession has the prop-
erty." Jeffries, 5 EL. & BL. at 806, 119 Eng. Rep. at 681.
110. See supra note 99.
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of personal property."' If the subject of the conversion suit is, for
instance, an automobile, proof of legal title would be relatively un-
complicated. Automobile titles, along with notations of interests in
the auto, are generally recorded with state governmental agencies."'
Thus, the evidence required to prove a third party's title to a con-
verted automobile would be readily accessible." 3 However, if the con-
verted chattels are somewhat less valuable and more readily con-
cealable than an automobile, proof of title becomes substantially more
difficult. For example, few people could prove with a high degree of
certainty that they own the watch or other jewelry they wear. It may
be even more difficult to prove title to more common items of per-
sonalty such as clothes, housewares, or tools."4 Generally, no form
of recorded title exists for such items. Proof of their ownership
depends exclusively on sales receipts, cancelled checks, and live
witness testimony. Thus, by prohibiting the defendant in a conver-
sion suit from pleading the jus tertii defense, these courts relieve plain-
tiffs of the onerous burden inherent in any attempt to prove absolute
title in personal property."A second justification frequently employed
in support of the "possession rule" approach stems in large part from
the historical origins of the tort of conversion.' When the action of
trover developed as a branch of the action on the case, its allegations
were patterned after those used in the earlier action of detinue sur
trover."7 One of these allegations was that the plaintiff, while being
possessed of the chattels, casually lost them. Only an individual in
possession of the chattels is capable of losing them. A possessor of
chattels, however, is not necessarily their owner."8 Consequently,
courts applying the "possession rule" theorize that trover, from which
the tort of conversion evolved, developed as a possessory action."'
Therefore, the conversion suit is essentially a remedial measure for
substantial interferences with the peaceable possession of personal
111. See Warren, supra note 66, at 1098.
112. Indiana, for example, requires automobiles to be registered with the state.
IND. CODE ANN. S 9-1-4-1 (Burns 1980).
113. The information received when an automobile is registered includes the
name of the owner, his address and the car's serial number. IND. CODE ANN. S 9-1-4-2.
114. "Are we required to keep receipts for out toothbrushes, t-shirts and tires-
especially when they are all non-deductible items and when it is hard enough to keep
track of the deductible items." Brief for Appellant at 17, Noble v. Moistner, __ Ind.
App._, 388 N.E.2d 620 (1979).
115. Id. at ___, 389 N.E.2d at 622.
116. See supra note 16.
117. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
118. A possessor may be, for example, a lessee, bailee, thief or a finder.
119. Note, A New Found Haliday, supra note 3, at 522.
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property. When the theoretical foundation of conversion is structured
in this manner, evidence of a third party's title to the converted chat-
tels is irrelevant to any material issue in the conversion suit.'2 '
Various additional grounds support the application of the "posses-
sion rule" approach. American courts have frequently stated that as
between the first possessor and the wrongdoer, the first possessor
is the proper party to account to a third person with a superior title
to the converted chattels.'21 A first possessor is more likely to have
knowledge of a conversion than is a third party who is out of
possession. ' Also, the first possessor is the proper party to settle
or litigate with a third party any remaining questions of ownership.'"
Application of the "possession rule" approach effectuates these policies.
At least one commentator has suggested that adherence to the "posses-
sion rule" is justified on grounds of business and commercial
convenience.' 2' It is commercially expedient, according to this argu-
ment, to treat the possessor of chattels as their owner.'25 Therefore,
since the effect of the "possession rule" is to raise a conclusive
presumption of title in the possessor, it facilitates commercial trans-
actions. Finally, the sheer weight of decisional precedent supports
selection of the "possession rule" approach when dealing with the jus
tertii defense issue.
26
A majority of American jurisdictions and all English courts
adhere to the "possession rule" approach. The essence of this approach
is that the defendant in a conversion suit may not introduce evidence
of a third party's title to the converted goods unless he is also able
to connect himself with that title. In addition, application of this rule
is not dependent upon an absolute title to the converted goods in the
plaintiff. Significant justifications have been raised in support of this
approach to the jus tertii defense. There are, however, a substantial
number of jurisdictions which have found overwhelming justification
for permitting the defendant to plead the jus tertii defense.
The Jus Tertii Approach
Application of the jus tertii approach can best be illustrated by
120. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE S 185 (2d ed.
1972).
121. In this context, "first possessor" denominates the plaintiff or one from
whom the chattels were converted. The "wrongdoer" is the defendant or converter.
122. Note, A New Found Haliday, supra note 3, at 522.
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 895 comment d (1979).
124. W. PROSSER. supra note 2, S 15 at 95.
125. Id.
126. Note, A New Found Haliday, supra note 3, at 522.
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examination of a frequently cited North Carolina case." 7 In that case,
Iowa McCoy received a grant of a certain tract of land from the state.
This grant mistakenly encompassed land which the state had pre-
viously granted to a third party. Thus, Mrs. McCoy was a trespasser
on this tract of land."= Believing that she had a valid title to the tract,
Mrs. McCoy assigned the timber rights to the plaintiffs who felled
the trees and trimmed them into logs. While the logs lay on a nearby
river bank awaiting transfer to a local mill, the defendants acquired
their possession. They later sold the logs to a lumber company. ' In
the subsequent conversion suit, the plaintiff sought a judgment against
the defendants for the full value of the converted logs. The defen-
dants introduced evidence of the prior grantee's title to the land but
did not connect themselves with that title. 3 '
In its opinion, the North Carolina Supreme Court applied the
jus tertii approach to these facts. 3' Possession, the court stated, raised
the strongest presumption of title.' In fact, the court suggested that
it was possible for a plaintiff to succeed in his conversion action by
showing that he was possessed of the chattels when they were
converted.'1 The court promptly pointed out, however, that when a
defendant is capable of showing that a third party has a superior title
to the converted chattels, the presumption of title is not only rebut-
ted, it is completely extinguished." Thus, when the defendants in-
troduced their evidence of the prior grantee's superior title to the
land, the plaintiff was completely foreclosed from recovery on his con-
version complaint.'3 It is important to emphasize that this court, unlike
127. Russell v. Hill, 125 N.C. 470, 34 S.E. 640 (1899).
128. Id. at -, 34 S.E. at 640.
129. The defendants sold the converted logs for $686.84 to a local lumber com-
pany which was bankrupt at the time of trial. Id.
130. The defendants were unable to connect themselves with the superior title
of the third party. Therefore, if the "possession rule" had been applied in this case,
the defendants clearly would have been unable to raise the jus tertii defense. Ander-
son, 51 Minn. at 296, 53 N.W. at 637.
131. The court relied heavily on an earlier North Carolina decision, Barwick
v. Barwick, 33 N.C. 67 (1850). In that case, the defendants sold slaves to the plaintiff
but later resold the same slaves to another individual. Subsequently, the plaintiff
brought an action of trover for the conversion of the slaves. On appeal, the Barwick
court permitted the defendants to defeat the plaintiffs suit by introducing evidence
of a third party's life estate in the slaves. Id. at 68.
132. Russell, 125 N.C. at ___, 34 S.E. at 640 (quoting Laspeyre v. McFarland,
4 N.C. 447 (1817)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 640.
135. Id.
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the courts which employ the "possession rule" approach, did not re-
quire the defendants to connect themselves with the superior title.3 '
Jurisdictions which have adopted the jus tertii approach utilized by
the North Carolina courts do so for several reasons.
Analysis of the modern tort of conversion as an action to try
title in the first instance justifies application of the jus tertii approach.
An early proponent of this view has suggested that the chief func-
tion of a conversion action today is to try the title to personal
property."3 When the action is framed in this manner, the primary
issue in the conversion litigation becomes who was the owner of the
chattels at the time of their conversion. If the defendant is able to
show that a third party has a superior claim to the converted goods,
then the defendant is in a position to defeat the plaintiff's conversion
suit." Therefore, jurisdictions which adhere to the jus tertii approach
reason that evidence of a third party's title is relevant to material
issues in the conversion suit.'39 Additional rationales which support
the jus tertii approach derive from this characterization of conver-
sion as a title action.' 4'
Protection of defendants from the potential of multiple liability
is the justification most frequently cited in support of the jus tertii
approach. 4 ' A plaintiff who successfully prosecutes his conversion ac-
tion is entitled to a judgment against the defendant for the full value
of the converted goods.142 If a third party subsequently initiates a sec-
ond conversion suit against the defendant, payment of the prior judg-
ment does not bar recovery by that third party.' Consequently, a
136. As a prerequisite to the introduction of evidence tending to show a superior
title in a third party, "possession rule" courts require that the defendant connect himself
to that title. In other words, the defendant must show that he is, in some manner,
claiming under the authority of the third party's superior title. See supra text accom-
panying note 93.
137. See Warren, supra note 66, at 1101.
138. Once the defendant introduces evidence of a third party's superior title,
the plaintiff must go forward and prove that he has the superior title to the con-
verted goods. 2 T. COOLEY. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS S 329, 489 (4th ed. 1932).
This can be a formidable burden. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
140. Characterization of the conversion suit as a title action should be con-
trasted with the view of "possession rule" jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions argue that
conversion, like its predecessors detinue and trespass, is actually a possessory action.
See supra text accompanying notes 100-02, 116-20.
141. See, e.g., Clapp v. Glidden, 39 Me. 448, 450 (1855).
142. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
143. The defendant may not employ the res judicata defense when the third
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defendant may be placed in the position of paying for the same chat-
tels twice.'" In order to prevent this obvious injustice, some courts
permit the defendant to plead the jus tertii defense in response to
the plaintiffs conversion suit. When this evidence of a third party's
superior title to the converted goods is introduced, the plaintiffs claim
will be precluded. 1" Thus, application of the jus tertii approach vir-
tually ensures that only one plaintiff, the party with a superior title,
may receive a judgment against the defendant for the full value of
the converted chattels.
Finally, application of the jus tertii approach can be rationalized
by closely examining the early authorities from which the "posses-
sion rule" evolved. The eighteenth century English case, Armory v.
Delamirie, 7 is frequently cited in support of the "possession rule"
approach. In that case, the finder of a jewel sued its converter in
trover. The court ruled that a finder had a sufficient property interest
in the chattels he found to maintain an action on the case for trover
against all but the rightful owner."8 It appears from the report of
the case that the defendant did not introduce any evidence which iden-
tified the rightful owner of the jewel.' Had a rightful owner been
known, courts applying the jus tertii rule suggest that his title could
have been offered in defense of the finder's trover action."0 Essen-
tially, these courts argue that the jus tertii approach is not ruled out
by the decision in Armory, but rather is consistent with it.''
Courts have traditionally employed two approaches to the jus
tertii plea. A majority of the jurisdictions do not allow a defendant
to raise the jus tertii defense unless he can connect himself to the
third party's title. Courts which reject this "possession rule" approach
party did not participate in the prior conversion action. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 4449 (1981).
144. In any subsequent conversion suits against the defendant, successful plain-
tiffs are entitled to the full value of the converted chattels. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 135 and 138.
146. A plaintiff who is unsuccessful in his conversion suit may still maintain
a trespass action against the defendant. See J. FLEMING, supra note 19, at 50.
147. 1 Strange. 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722).
148. Id.
149. The report of the case does not specifically address this point. However,
the court did not indicate that a rightful owner was known.
150. Russell, 125 N.C. at -, 34 S.E. at 641.
151. If the North Carolina courts were confronted with an Armory situation,
they too would find for the plaintiff. The courts in North Carolina would, however,
permit the defendant to raise the title of the rightful owner, if one came forward. Id.
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unconditionally permit the defendant to raise the superior title. Each
alternative is supported by significant justifications. Indiana courts
have, however, found the rationales in support of the jus tertii ap-
proach more persuasive.
The Indiana Approach To The Jus Tertii Defense
Indiana courts emphasize ownership rather than possession when
defining the tort of conversion. Conversion has been defined by the
Indiana courts as "an appropriation of the personal property of another
to a party's own use and benefit in exclusion and defiance of the
owner's rights and under an inconsistent claim of title." '52 Thus, the
essence of conversion actions in Indiana is the wrongful interference
with the absolute dominion over the personal property owned by the
person deprived of its use." This acute emphasis on title is reflected
in the pleading and proof requirements demanded of plaintiffs seek-
ing to litigate conversion actions in Indiana courts.'"
Plaintiffs suing in conversion are required to plead three primary
allegations. '5 5 First, a plaintiff must allege that, at the time of the
conversion, he had complete title, either special or general," in the
converted chattels.'57 Second, it must be alleged that at the time of
the conversion, plaintiff had the possession or the right to immediate
possession of the converted chattels.' Finally, the plaintiff is required
to allege that the defendant converted the personal property in con-
troversy to his own use and benefit.' The plaintiff bears the burden
of proof on each of these allegations.' A defendant may, however,
defeat the plaintiffs proof by introducing evidence which contradicts
the plaintiff's allegations.
152. Hunter v. Cronkhite, 9 Ind. App. 470, 471, 36 N.E. 924, 925 (1894).
153. Fagan v. Babacz, 102 Ind. App. 558, 561, 1 N.E.2d 299, 300 (1936).
154. See, e.g., Foley v. Colby, 148 Ind. App. 391, 397, 266 N.E.2d 619, 623 (1971)
(Staton, J., concurring).
155. Contrast the allegations required by Indiana courts with those required
in the original action of trover. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
156. "General property" is defined as the "right and property in a thing en-
joyed by the general owner." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (5th ed. 1979). Special prop-
erty is "property of a qualified, temporary, or limited nature; as distinguished from
absolute, general or unconditional property." Id. at 1096. For example, a bailee has
a special property in the bailed articles. Id.
157. Ax v. Schloot, 116 Ind. App. 366, 370, 64 N.E.2d 668, 669 (1946).
158. Swope v. Paul, 4 Ind. App. 463, 464, 31 N.E. 42, 43 (1892).
159. Ax, 116 Ind. App. at 371, 64 N.E.2d at 669-70.
160. Noble, - Ind. App. at _ 388 N.E.2d at 622.
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Indiana courts permit the defendant to introduce evidence of a
third party's superior title to the converted goods under a general
denial of the plaintiffs conversion complaint.' It is incumbent upon
a plaintiff to allege and prove that he had either a general or special
property interest in the converted chattels.' When, however, a plain-
tiff shows that he had the possession of the chattels at the time of
their conversion, a strong presumption of title is raised in favor of
the plaintiff.13 If the defendant offers no evidence to rebut this
presumption, the plaintiff has satisfied his burden of proving owner-
ship of the converted chattels.' However, if the defendant introduces
evidence of a third party's superior title to the converted chattels,
the presumption raised by the plaintiffs prior possession is rebutted.",
Ownership of the converted chattels then becomes an issue subject
to jury determination. ' " Therefore, unlike "possession rule" jurisdic-
tions, Indiana courts do not shift the burden to the defendant to prove
that he had a right to interfere with the plaintiff's possession."7 The
plaintiff retains the burden of proving his general or special property
interest in the converted chattels. Consequently, a plaintiff's attempt
to recover the full value of the converted chattels may be frustrated
if the defendant produces evidence of a superior title.
In summary, courts have traditionally implemented one of two
approaches to the jus tertii plea, While each approach is supported
by several strong rationales, Indiana courts have long determined that
the jus tertii approach is the more appropriate response. Both the
"possession rule" and the jus tertii approach, however, share a com-
mon deficiency. Neither approach adequately protects all interests in
the converted chattels. As will be demonstrated, a more rational ap-
proach exists which would, in a single suit, satisfy all interests in
the converted goods.
TOWARD A MORE RATIONAL APPROACH
The approaches traditionally applied by the courts in response
to the defendant's jus tertii plea do not adequately protect all poten-
161. Swope, 4 Ind. App. at 464, 31 N.E. at 43.
162. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
163. Noble, __ Ind. App. at __ 388 N.E.2d at 622.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See 31A C.JS. Evidence S 117 (1964).
167. Indiana courts argue that the effect of the "possession rule" is to shift
the burden to the defendant to show that he had a right to convert the goods. Noble,
- Ind. App. at -, 388 N.E.2d at 622.
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tial interests in converted chattels. Adoption of a more rational alter-
native approach will rectify this serious deficiency. Before this alter-
native approach can be developed and examined, it is necessary to
analyze the specific deficiencies inherent in the traditional approaches.
Inadequate Protection Of Interests In Converted Chattels
In every conversion action at least three interests are involved.
The plaintiff, or first possessor, has a possessory property interest
in the converted chattel."9 The defendant's primary interest is in escap-
ing double liability for the same conversion.'70 Finally, the true owner
has his own property interest in the converted goods. 7 ' Both the
"possession rule" and jus tertii approaches give full consideration to
either the plaintiffs or defendant's interests.' Neither approach,
however, protects the superior interests of the true owner.'73
Jurisdictions which employ the "possession rule" afford the in-
terests of a plaintiff full consideration.'74 If the plaintiff was in posses-
sion of the chattels at the time of their conversion, application of the
"possession rule" raises a presumption of title in the plaintiff.' Unless
the defendant is able to connect himself with the superior title of a
third party, this presumption of title is conclusive as against the
defendant.' The plaintiff is then entitled to the full value of the con-
verted chattels based solely upon his prior possession.'77 Therefore,
application of the "possession rule" fully protects the plaintiffs'
possessory property interests in the converted chattels.' The interests
168. Warren, supra note 66 at 1097. In his article, Professor Warren deals
primarily with the bailment situation. His analysis, however, is applicable to all con-
version actions.
169. See J. CRIBBETT, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 12-15 (2d ed. 1975).
170. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
171. See J. CRIBBETT. supra note 169 at 15-16. In the context of this discussion,
the terms "true owner" and "third party" have been used interchangeably. It should
be noted, however, that the third party claiming a superior title in the converted
chattels may not necessarily be the "true owner" of those chattels. He may, in fact,
only be a prior possessor of the converted chattels. Id. at 12.
172. See Warren, supra note 66, at 1097.
173. For a discussion of the importance of protecting the true owner's prop-
erty interests in the converted chattels, see E. WARREN. TROVER AND CONVERSION (1936).
174. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Anderson, 51 Minn. at 295, 53 N.W. at 637.
176. 2 T. COOLEY. supra note 138, S 329 at 491.
177. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. Of course, the plaintiff must
also prove that the defendant converted the chattels to his own use and benefit. See
Noble, - Ind. App. at , 388 N.E.2d at 623.
178. The "possession rule," in practice, over-protects the plaintiffs interest
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of the defendant and true owner are not, however, afforded adequate
consideration by jurisdictions which employ the traditional "posses-
sion rule" approach.
When the defendant in a conversion action is subjected to an
application of the "possession rule," his interest in escaping double
liability is not given full consideration.'79 A defendant who fails to suc-
cessfully defend the first possessor's conversion suit is required to
pay him the full value of the converted chattels.' This judgment does
not, however, prevent the true owner from bringing a second conver-
sion suit against the defendant.'' If the true owner successfully main-
tains his conversion action, he too is entitled to the full value of the
converted chattels from the defendant. 82 Therefore, if the defendant
is precluded from pleading the true owner's title in defense to the
first possessor's conversion suit, he may be subject to double liability.
Finally, application of the "possession rule" does not adequately
protect the true owner's property interest in the converted chattels."
The presumption raised by the plaintiffs prior possession permits the
court to treat the plaintiff as the "owner" of the converted chattels."&
Unless the defendant is able to connect himself to the third party's
superior title, that presumption is conclusive and the plaintiff is en-
titled to the full value of the chattels."5 If the true owner desires
to satisfy his property interest in the converted chattels, he must
initiate his own conversion suit against either the plaintiff or
defendant.'" Consequently, the interests of the true owner are in no
manner furthered by the application of the "possession rule."
The inadequate consideration afforded the defendant's interests
because it allows courts to treat the possessor as the owner. See Warren, supra note
66, at 1088.
179. See supra note 141-46 and accompanying text.
180. Warren, supra note 66, at 1088.
181. "[A] judgment when rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subse-
quent action, between the same parties or those in privity with them, upon the same
claim or demand . B J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.405[1]
(2d ed. 1982).
182. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
183. See Warren, supra note 66, at 1097.
184. See, e.g., Preston v. Cloquet Tie & Post Co., 114 Minn. 398, 401, 131 N.W.
474, 475 (1911).
185. See supra notes 93, 98 and accompanying text.
186. The true owner of the chattels is entitled to bring his own conversion
action against either the plaintiff or the defendant regardless of the outcome of the
original litigation. He must, of course, carry his burden of proof on each element of
the conversion action. See C. FIFOOT. supra note 18, at 104-05.
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by application of the "possession rule" is rectified when the jus tertii
approach is employed.187 Essentially, the jus tertii approach permits
the defendant to introduce evidence of a third party's superior title
without connecting himself to that title.' s This evidence, if sufficient,
will defeat the plaintiffs conversion action. 89 If it is, however, the
true owner who sues for conversion, the defendant will be unable to
produce evidence of a superior title. 1'0 Application of the jus tertii
approach, therefore, insures that the defendant will be required to
pay the full value of the converted chattels only to their true owner.
The jus tertii approach does not, however, give adequate con-
sideration to the interests of either the plaintiff or the true owner.
Jurisdictions which adhere to the jus tertii approach permit the defen-
dant to plead the third party's title without connecting himself to it. 9'
The plaintiff is then, in effect, forced to litigate the claim of a third
party who is not in court.'92 This places a greater burden on the plain-
tiff to protect his property interest in the converted chattels, even
though his interest in them is clearly superior to that of the
defendant.'93 A true owner's interests are afforded no greater protec-
tion. As was the case with the "possession rule," the jus tertii ap-
proach ignores the true owner's property interest in the converted
chattels."' If the true owner wishes to enforce his property interest,
he must still initiate his own conversion suit.'95 Thus, while affording
the defendant's interests added protection, the jus tertii approach ig-
nores the concerns of the plaintiff and true owner.
Although a conversion suit ostensibly involves only the interests
of the plaintiff and defendant, when the defendant attempts to raise
the jus tertii defense the interests of a third party are injected directly
into the litigation. The traditional approaches do not provide a con-
187. Primarily, the defendant's interest is in avoiding the possibility of paying
for the same goods twice. See supra text accompanying note 170.
188. See, e.g., Russell, 125 N.C. at - , 34 S.E. at 640.
189. See, e.g., Schermerhorn v. Van Volkenburgh, 11 Johns. 529 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1814).
190. By definition, the true owner has the most superior title. Thus, the jus
tertii defense would be unavailable in this situation.
191. See Russell, 125 N.C. at - , 34 S.E. at 640.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 895 comment d (1979).
193. Id.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 183-86.
195. The true owner of the converted chattels is not automatically joined in
the conversion action when the defendant raises the jus tertii defense. Thus, unless
the true owner moves to join the original litigation, the true owner must initiate and
prosecute his own conversion action.
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ceptual framework within which each of the three pertinent interests
can be adequately addressed. A rational and systematic approach to
the jus tertii defense would enable courts to balance all relevant in-
terests in a single cause of action.
Compulsory Joinder Of The Third Party As An Efficient
Resolution
Compulsory joinder of the third party would enable a court to
efficiently consider all pertinent interests in the converted chattels.'
First, the interests of the third party are given complete protection
when he is joined to the original conversion suit.197 Once he has been
joined, the third party may seek compensation for the injury he has
suffered from the plaintiff, the defendant or both. Compulsory joinder,
therefore, obviates the need for the third party to initiate subsequent
conversion litigation.'98 Secondly, joinder of the third party to the
original conversion action insures protection of the plaintiffs
interests.'" The plaintiff is no longer required to litigate his claim
to the converted chattels with a party who is not in court."0 Finally,
joinder of the third party, whose superior title the defendant attempts
to plead in defense, protects the interests of defendant. 0' By joining
the third party, the defendant is shielded from potential double
liability."' Therefore, when a defendant to a conversion suit attempts
to plead the superior title of a third party in defense, joinder of that
third party ensures that the interests ignored by application of the
two traditional approaches are given full consideration.
In Indiana, Trial Rule 19 governs compulsory joinder of parties."
Application of this procedural device is dependent upon two
196. The analysis here is restricted to application of compulsory joinder provi-
sions in Indiana. This approach to the jus tertii plea is, however, applicable as well
to jurisdictions which employ the "possession rule" approach.
197. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
198. Compulsory joinder of additional parties is partially justified by the
"societal interest in the orderly, expeditious administration of justice." Reed, Com-
pulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REv. 327, 330 (1957). Joinder
of the third party to the original conversion suit reduces occurrences of repetitious
litigation and, thus, promotes the societal interest in efficient dispute resolution.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 169, 192-93.
200. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
201. See supra text accompanying note 170.
202. See J. MOORE & T. CURRIER, supra 181, at 0.405[1].
203. Joinder of Person Needed for Just Adjudication
(A) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service
of process shall be joined as a party in the action if:
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties; or
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preliminary determinations."' It must first be determined whether the
third party is one who ought to be joined. Second, the feasibility of
joining that party must be determined.
The third party must be joined, if feasible, to the original con-
version action when any one of the three "tests" set out in Trial Rule
19 is met."O In the context of the jus tertii defense to a conversion
action, two of these "tests" are clearly applicable. First, failure to
join the third party may hinder that party's ability to protect his in-
terest in the converted chattels."6 Second, continuation of the original
conversion action in the absence of the third party would subject the
defendant to potential double liability."7 Consequently, Trial Rule 19
requires that the third party be joined if it is feasible to do so.
Feasibility of joinder is a function of two limitations, availability
(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the ac-
tion and is so situated that the disposition of the action in
his absence may:
(a) as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest, or
(b) leave any of the persons already parties sub-
ject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
reason of his claimed interest.
If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that
he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses
to do so, he may be made a defendant.
IND. T. R. 19(A).
204. Professor Harvey suggests in his commentary to IND. T. R. 19 that the
rule requires determination of "(1) [whether] a person should be joined in the suit
as a party, and if that is not feasible, (2) how to proceed without that person." 2 W.
HARVEY. INDIANA PRACTICE 263 (1970). However, the feasibility inquiry cannot be mini-
mized and in fact constitutes a separate determination itself. Analysis of the rule,
therefore, indicates that the pertinent considerations are (1) whether the party ought
to be joined, and if so, (2) whether that is feasible. For a discussion of the proper
procedure should it not be feasible to join the third party see supra note 211.
205. The three "tests" are succinctly restated in the Civil Study Commission
Comments to Trial Rule 19.
First, if complete relief cannot be accorded among those already par-
ties in his absence a party must be joined ...
Second, a party claiming an "interest relating to the subject of the
action" must be joined if disposition of the action in his absence will, as
a practical matter, impede his ability to protect that interest ...
Third, a party claiming an "interest" relating to- the subject of the
action [is] indispensible if persons already parties are left with substantial
risk of incurring inconsistent obligations.
Civil Code Study Commissions Comments to Ind. T. R. 19(A) (as quoted in 2 W. HARVEY.
supra note 204 at 248) (emphasis in original).
206. IND. T. R. 19(A)(2)(a).
207. IND. T. R. 19(A)(2)(b).
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of service of process and the extent of the court's jurisdiction."8 The
Indiana Trial Rules provide a comprehensive system for the service
of process which would permit service of any third party.' Moreover,
conversion is an in rem action.21 A third party who claims an interest
in the converted chattels, would, therefore, be subject to the court's
jurisdiction."' Joinder, then, is not only required, it is feasible. Thus,
this approach will ensure that when a third party's superior title is
raised in defense of the plaintiffs conversion suit, all three relevant
interests will be considered.212
CONCLUSION
The modern tort of conversion has become the primary action
for interferences with personal property. It evolved from and was in-
fluenced by the old common law actions of detinue sur trover and
trespass. In fact, trover, the immediate predecessor of conversion,
eventually addressed almost all the injuries previously dealt with by
the earlier actions. Although it solved some of the problems inherent
in detinue and trespass, conversion created one lingering problem of
its own.
Conversion suits require courts to determine whether the defen-
dant is entitled to introduce evidence of a third party superior title
to the converted chattels. Traditionally, courts have followed two ap-
208. 2 W. HARVEY. supra note 204, at 264.
209. Service of process in Indiana is governed by IND. T. R. 4-5. See especially
IND. T. R. 4.4, 4.9 which set forth the bases for jurisdiction.
210. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958).
211. Id. There may be situations in which joinder of third party will not be
possible. For example, if the third party is unknown or cannot be brought within the
court's jurisdiction, joinder may not be accomplished. See 2 W. HARVEY, supra note
204, at 265. In such a situation the defendant will be precluded from employing the
jus tertii defense. This result does not, however, weaken the proposed approach. The
compulsory joinder approach will still provide the necessary analytical framework from
which to assess the relative strengths of the pertinent interests.
212. Earlier in this note Noble v. Moistner, - Ind. App. -, 388 N.E.2d
620 (1979), was discussed. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11. In that case, the
Indiana Appellate Court ruled that the defendant police officers were entitled to raise
the jus tertii defense even though the identity of the third party was unknown. Noble,
__ Ind. App. at __, 388 N.E.2d at 622. Under this approach, the plaintiffs' conver-
sion claim is effectively defeated. See supra text accompanying notes 135, 138. If the
compulsory joinder approach had been employed by the appellate court in Noble, the
plaintiff would have prevailed. The proposed approach requires the defendant who
raises the jus tertii defense to join the third party. See supra notes 196-202 and ac-
companying text. Therefore, since the third party was not known and could not be
joined, the defendant could not use the jus tertii defense.
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proaches. A majority of jurisdictions employ the "possession rule"
which precludes introduction of the jus tertii defense unless the defen-
dant is able to connect himself to the third party's title. The remain-
ing jurisdictions, including Indiana, employ the jus tertii approach
which permits the defendant to introduce any third party's superior
title. Neither of these approaches adequately protects all the interests
in the disputed chattels. Compulsory joinder of the third party to the
original conversion litigation, however, permits the court to fully con-
sider the three interests in the chattels. In light of the frequency of
conversion suits, adoption by the Indiana courts of this approach for
dealing with the problem is strongly suggested.
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